Soft Targets: Stemming the Tide of Vehicle Ramming Attacks
Managing risk on a daily basis requires a security executive not only to be aware of the vulnerabilities and criticality of organizational assets but also to adapt security strategies and systems to new threats. Adaptation is a reactive process, but to adequately manage risk, save lives and protect assets, a proactive approach is often more effective.
An example of how security strategies evolve around emerging threats in a reactive way, before a proactive posture is taken, can be seen in the response to active shooter attacks. Following the Columbine shooting police departments across the nation reconsidered response plans. The years that have passed since Columbine have seen the proliferation of these kinds of attacks, and this has given the law enforcement and security communities time to develop awareness and prevention strategies, train people to survive these attacks, and better prepare first-responders to react to, mitigate, and recover from them. It is hard to quantify how many lives have been saved or attacks deterred as a result of preparation, but few would argue that the time and expense wasn’t worth saving even one life.
The first attack characterized as a vehicle ramming attack on a college campus occurred over a decade ago. An Iranian-American drove a rented SUV through a popular outdoor courtyard on the campus of The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in March of 2006. The motive for the attack was to “avenge the deaths or murders of Muslims around the World.” The attack injured nine pedestrians, and although barricades were available to prevent vehicular traffic from reaching that courtyard, they were not in place that day.
There were no such preparations made, or planning and training undertaken, significant enough to prevent or deter an Ohio State University student from ramming his car into pedestrians on a busy campus sidewalk. The car was stopped when it hit a concrete block, but the attacker continued to inflict harm upon bystanders with a butcher knife. A nearby university police officer shot and killed the attacker, but not before 11 people were injured in the ISIS-inspired attack that took place 10 years after the UNC - Chapel Hill attack. While casualties were avoided in each of these attacks, the evidence of how deadly they can be is well established.
Very recently, three ramming attacks in London, one of which is suspected to be an act of retribution against Muslims, as the attack took place in front of a Mosque, have claimed 12 lives and injured over 100 people. Twelve people were killed and dozens more, including two Americans, were injured when a terrorist drove a commercial truck into a Christmas Market in Berlin last year. An attack at a July 2016 Bastille Day celebration in Nice, France killed 84 people. ISIS took responsibility for it and the Berlin attack and while many militants and terrorists are using guns and bombs to commit acts of terror, using motor vehicles to inflict mass casualties is a growing trend. Rumiyah, the ISIS propaganda magazine, recommended the use of trucks in attacks. “Though being an essential part of modern-day life, very few actually comprehend the deadly and destructive capability of the motor vehicle and its capacity of reaching large numbers of casualties if used in a premeditated manner,” the magazine said.
Vehicle ramming attacks, so simple to execute and so hard for good investigative work to suss out preemptively, must, now draw the attention of the security community. This is particularly true for law enforcement and security agencies responsible for campus safety and security. Open campuses with large outdoor gathering places, heavily used pedestrian pathways, sporting and cultural events, and diverse populations are an amalgamation of key target characteristics for these attacks.
Vehicle ramming attacks can be accomplished with little to no training and the increased use of ramming as an attack has been a concern of law enforcement agencies for many years. Four years before the Christmas ramming attacks in France of 2014 and the 2013 ramming attack of a British soldier in London the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) suggested that the number of vehicle ramming attacks would increase. A 2010 DHS report warned that vehicle ramming attacks using modified or unmodified vehicles would likely target crowds, buildings, and other overseas targets.
An increase in the awareness of the threat is clear in the security community and it is realistic to expect that universities are among the facilities considering proactive steps to reduce the likelihood of these attacks and to mitigate their effectiveness. A veteran Patrol Lieutenant at a large Southern school, says that his university does use bollards to create a pedestrian only walkway through the university campus, and wedge barriers to increase the pedestrian-only envelope around sporting events on campus. Interestingly, however, the objective of these measures, as it concerns planning and implementation, are traffic management, so any impact on the vehicle ramming attack threat is incidental.
“No one wants to think of the worst-case elephant in the room, so we need to use soft language to get buy in on these measures. Preparing for the worst is expensive”, says the Patrol Lieutenant. He further explained that, although these incidents are discussed among the force, formal response protocols are not currently in the training plan, although he expects that will change in next year’s training plan.
"Campus police need to engage all stakeholders within the university and surrounding area, including the students themselves, to create both an accurate training regimen and a new culture that emphasizes preparedness over blind, reactionary panic. It needs to be done no less than bi-annually and combined with some other form of incident (active shooter, IED, etc) to make the training both fresh and emphasizing the all-hazards approach that a complex emergency mandates," concludes the university Patrol Lieutenant.
The 2015 Commercial Facilities Sector-Specific Plan of the DHS National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) prioritizes threat and vulnerability assessment sector-wide to inform facility risk management. Specifically, it seeks to “facilitate collaboration among owners, management companies, and tenants, along with federal, state and local partners, to improve joint risk mitigation and response to attacks”. This is a broad aspect of the plan; one that touches every aspect of what security professionals do from highly technical Smart City Physical Security Information Management systems to cybersecurity protocols and processes, to physical security systems and strategies like CPTED.
The NIPP standards for commercial facilities can provide a framework for colleges and universities to follow to reduce the risk of attack and mitigate and respond to them. Increasingly facility managers and security directors at colleges and universities are well-advised to seek means to harden soft targets. Soft targets can typically be defined as vulnerable, unprotected civilian centric places where security is not a primary mission. The goal of soft target hardening is to remove the threat before it is presented through security planning and the implementation of measures aimed at reducing the terrorists’ opportunity and motivation to attack.
New York City’s decision to utilize 81 sand-filled sanitation trucks to block side streets along the route of the Macy’s Thanksgiving Day Parade to thwart copy-cat attacks of the Nice attack is an example of the type of risk and threat mitigation planning NIPP calls for. NYC public safety officials did not rely on sophisticated intelligence or high-powered security electronics alone to reduce the risk of a vehicle ramming attack. The added measure of defining and defending the boundary of the parade from vehicle incursion using a rigid physical barrier was an overt deterrent that to any terrorist represented a significant obstacle to a successful attack.
Campus security directors and managers may be challenged by overcoming design deficiencies on campuses older than the growing and constantly changing terror threat. They may also have limited resources available to mitigate those deficiencies, particularly when deterrence and defense would require significant architectural changes. These cases should be examined for opportunities to implement CPTED.
Specifically, regarding vehicle-ramming and vehicle-borne IED threats consider the approaches to the highly trafficked areas of the campus. Estimate the maximum attainable speeds along approaches and identify thoroughfares and pedestrian patterns. Seek opportunities to use environmental design to slow vehicle approaches, such as placing crash rated planters on corner approaches to widen turn angles or along the perimeter of courtyards and event centers to absorb the energy a vehicle-borne threat, possibly rendering it immobile. Consider trees and boulders in pedestrian thoroughfares to limit vehicle penetration into these areas. Consult with security professionals who have faced similar challenges and tap security designers and consultants to conduct security assessments and make site specific recommendations for soft target hardening based on systematic and comprehensive surveys.
In addition to soft-target hardening, a training and awareness program should be put in place to help victims survive or avoid attacks and to help first-responders identify and react to attacks. Dispatchers should be trained to identify routine reports of a hit and run as a possible ramming attack, particularly if multiple reports are made in the same area. One way to accomplish this is to ask callers if the car is stopped, as this is the expected action a driver would take after an accidental collision. It should also be emphasized to dispatchers that in the event they suspect an attack to send additional response units and to notify responding units of their suspicion immediately. It’s also critical that dispatchers are able to identify the vehicle involved for responders.
First-responders should be trained to consider the chance of an ongoing attack and to check for secondary scenes. The Ohio State University assailant continued to attack people with a knife once his vehicle was disabled. Additionally, procedures should be established to manage scenes that may be spread out over a large area. A search of the vehicle for explosive devices or a kidnapped driver should be a part of pre-planned responses to these attacks. Also, it is imperative that the first-responders understand that the injuries of those attacked will present differently for a ramming attack than say a bombing or shooting. Many victims will suffer from internal injuries that may make it challenging to identify the most critically wounded and unlike a bombing in which those furthest from the blast typically are the least critically injured it will be challenging in a ramming attack locate those in the gravest danger. It is also important that first-responders stay current in their ability to treat and identify knife wounds, vehicle impacts and blast injuries.
Increasing the awareness of students, faculty, and staff of how to reduce their own chances of being harmed in an attack is also a responsibility incumbent on campus security directors and police chiefs. Campus users should be encouraged to walk facing traffic and to use sidewalks and pathways with barriers or cars parked along the street when possible. Loitering on open and unprotected sidewalks should be discouraged. They should also be made aware of signs of an attack such as vehicles speeding through inappropriate or unexpected areas, revving engines, and unusual vehicle movements. Additionally, it should be emphasized that the few seconds it takes to react can make the difference and so things that hinder situational awareness, such as headphones or cell phones, should be limited in use when walking the campus.
If an attack has occurred bystanders should be aware that the attack could be ongoing and that before rushing in to provide aid to the injured they should ensure there is no immediate danger from an ongoing attack or multiple attackers. Campus users should also be instructed to move indoors immediately if there is an attack underway, though they should also be cautioned against remaining in that location once they perceive they are safe and instructed to continue to move away from the scene of the attack if able to do so.
The urgent need to train and plan for vehicle ramming attacks in the current threat environment is a call to arms for every security professional, especially those charged with protecting our institutions of higher learning. Soft target hardening strategies should be employed and security technologies should be assessed to identify ways they can be used as force multipliers in response to attacks. Prevention and awareness programs should include training for first responders and civilians alike. Reducing the frequency and impact of vehicle ramming attacks is one of the challenges the industry must meet successfully. Every community of specialization within the field has their role to play, and the game is definitely on.
About the Author: Mike Ventiere spent eight years as a member of the US Navy Security Forces and served in Bahrain, UAE, Greece, Djibouti, Qatar, Diego Garcia, and New Jersey on law enforcement, force protection, anti-terrorism, and anti-piracy assignments. He is certified by The American Board for Certification in Homeland Security and became the first active duty Master-at-Arms to win the ASIS/ Military Liaison Council CPP Certification Scholarship. He received a Bachelor’s Degree in Criminal Justice from Kutztown University of Pennsylvania and will earn a graduate degree in Security Management from American Military University this year. He is currently a security consultant and system designer with Professional Systems Engineering in Lansdale, PA.
