CPTED a Key Tool in Securing Today’s Schools

Designing safe schools is the responsibility of every community, while day-to-day operations are primarily the responsibility of teachers, school administrators, and school security/law enforcement officers. Before the first student walks the halls, however, an architect designs the school, creating subsequent relationships of people and their buildings.

The success or failure of each school is predisposed to the integration of security and crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) during the design process and budget limitations. The basic CPTED premise is that the effective use and design of the built environment can reduce the opportunity and fear of crime and result, in this case, in improvement in the quality of the educational experience. Designing the next generation of schools for the effective use of space with CPTED features will substantially reduce the opportunity and fear of crime.

CPTED By the Numbers

CPTED applies to both new and existing schools and is based on the concepts of natural surveillance, natural access control, territoriality, management and maintenance, and legitimate activity support. If a school layout seems unsafe, adopting a few CPTED fundamentals may help make it significantly safer. CPTED elements that can have the most impact on school security include:

• Providing for limited and controlled entrances.
• Security layering and zoning.
• Staff training and operational strategies for protecting the building and its users.
• Perimeter boundary definition.
• Reducing conflicting user traffic patterns.
• Securing the classrooms with improved door hardware.
• Having spaces for sheltering in place in the event of an active shooter situation.

School administrators and architects cannot select appropriate countermeasures unless clear objectives are identified. The threats to a school are either external (from outside influences and persons) or internal (from students, faculty, staff, and workplace violence). CPTED can make a direct impact on reducing external threats through the use of the concepts mentioned above. The internal threats can be primarily deterred through policy, procedure and management techniques, as opposed to physical design. When a school has multiple entrances and ground floor windows, for example, the threat and vulnerability levels increase greatly and make the facility much more difficult for the protection of people, property and information.

Safe school design involves four key areas that should include CPTED security layering/defensible space planning practices.

• Site design includes CPTED features of landscaping, exterior pedestrian routes, vehicular routes and parking, and recreational areas intending to protect and define the perimeter of the school campus.
• Building design CPTED features include building organization, exterior covered corridors, points of entry, enclosed exterior spaces, ancillary buildings, walls, windows, doors, roofs and lighting, to secure all the entries and access points into the buildings.
• Interior spaces include CPTED features of lobby and reception areas, corridors, restrooms, stairs and stairwells, cafeterias, auditoriums, gyms, libraries and media centers, classrooms, locker rooms, labs, shops, music and computer rooms, and administrative areas, with the goal of increasing visibility and natural surveillance of the hallways, and into the classrooms.
• Systems and equipment include CPTED features such as alarms and surveillance systems, fire control, HVAC and mechanical equipment, vending machines, duress alarms, elevators, telephone and visitor identification systems, to integrate safety and security measures and technologies seamlessly, with the new or existing school facilities.

Entry Points Must be Defined

A single point of entry is the new standard of care wherever possible. Depending on the size of the school, a single point of entry is preferred for maximum utilization of weapons screening, staffing and labor efficiency, and visitor entry. Weapons detectors can be integrated within an entryway, but with that comes the responsibility of pat-downs, package screening, and video recording to prevent frivolous claims of inappropriate searches. Access to areas from main entryways should be carefully planned, and not obscured. Main entryways should be obvious, and designed with CPTED features of access control, surveillance, and territoriality in mind. Treatments of secondary entries are just as important as primary entries in reducing the opportunity for unauthorized access.

Defining the primary and secondary entry points are crucial is where you allocate your security resources. Wherever there is an entrance, it will require access control, video surveillance, and most likely a capable guardian. It is this combination of security approaches using design, technology, and human supervision that create a layering effect that reduces the introduction of weapons, drugs, and trespassers. Secondary means of egress, such as fire exit doors, cannot be used as entrances. A CPTED goal would be that all exterior doors should remain locked throughout the day or school hours. The doors must comply with fire egress one-step release for exiting, but any kind of entrance hardware should be removed on the exterior of the door. All exterior door hinges should be non-removable to prevent forced entry or burglary.

Where there are primary entrances, there must be the ability to secure and lock the doors to prevent intrusion after the school day begins. Glazing on the entrance doors should be break-resistant or screened, to prevent a gunman from being able to shoot through the glass to gain access to the school. That is how the gunman at Sandy Hook Elementary entered the Connecticut school. Today’s standard of care for school entries is to have a double door security vestibule that provides a barrier between visitors, students, and faculty. Once inside the vestibule, the visitors or vendors can move into the school office areas to complete their entry process of visitor management systems.

Being able to identify who belongs on the school campus is a big CPTED consideration. Before the Stoneman Douglas shooting, students were required to have their student ID cards, but not display it. After the shooting, all students must wear their ID’s in a lanyard, like you would, attending a convention, or working in a company. This is the single easiest step that can be implemented and the one that has had the greatest resistance. If a student is required to have their ID displayed, then it removes the excuse for outsiders to come onto campus and enables staff to challenge persons not having their ID. When the gunman entered the Stoneman Douglas School, he had been a former student of the school, but when he arrived in an Uber to the school entrance with his satchel of armaments, he was not challenged by security staff that saw him arrive. They were trained to only observe and report and not intervene. Had the policy been in effect to challenge persons entering the property without school identification, the outcome would have been dramatically different.

Safety Protocols That Make Sense

Changes in fire code now make fire alarm pull stations optional. Classroom locks for schools must comply with fire and accessibility codes. While locks can prevent a hostage situation by using the door barricade devices, they can prevent quick response by police and EMS. Codes now allow school faculty/ administration three minutes to verify a fire condition, and either shut down the alarm or allow the alarm to activate, thereby evacuating the school. This was one of the lessons learned from the Stoneman Douglas shootings after the shooter’s weapon discharged smoke and activated the fire alarm system, thereby creating confusion about whether to evacuate or shelter in place.

Classroom doors should remain locked during regular school hours and provide the ability for the teacher to lock the doors quickly and automatically in the event of a lockdown call. Any gazing in classroom doors should be break-resistant, to deter reaching though and an opening the door. A window screen device built-in, or secondarily applied can be very helpful in denying an active shooter to see if there are persons in the classroom. It is unrealistic to design the doors and walls to be bullet resistant, for the speed and size of bullets vary greatly that the cost would be prohibitive.

Special access areas require careful attention to detail. Roof access needs to be secure but also in an area that permits quick and effortless access for maintenance staff. Other access areas such as electrical or mechanical rooms should be placed so they are not in danger of being compromised.

Foundational Technology

Video surveillance should be placed strategically at entrances, exits, and hallways. Cameras should operate continuously, and videotapes analyzed and archived. There is an over-reliance on technology. Many of the kids committing school-crime terrorism are looking for their moment of fame on video. Thus, cameras should be low profile or hidden from view.

Duress alarms provide security in isolated areas. Duress alarms should be in isolated areas such as restrooms and locker areas and integrated with other security systems. Several types of devices can be used to improve security. Electronic sensors can detect anything ranging from weapons to stolen library books. Security mirrors can be used in areas containing blind spots.

Communication systems must be integrated within the design and integration with other systems such as fire and duress alarms and video surveillance systems. Periphery observation and security checkpoints should have a clear and secure line of communication to main administrative areas. Computers should be individually secured and regularly checked. Areas containing high-end items should be adequately secured and observed.

School Security Strategies Evolve

New school design that incorporates CPTED concepts and strategies will be shaped differently than the past, with controlled entrances, an abundance of secured glazed windows that allow staff to see who is outside and observing and supervising what activities are happening. There will be sparser landscaping to reduce places for hiding, and secured perimeter fencing, panic duress buttons, double door entry systems, and door position switches that detect if all doors are properly secured. The new design and operational goal are to provide fewer places to hide or walk unnoticed and prevent unauthorized access onto the grounds and buildings.

Many schools in the U.S. have an inviting and open campus style, with multiple buildings, entrances and exits; large windows; and many opportunities for hiding or privacy. These design configurations are not conducive to many current security needs. Incorporating the principles of CPTED in the design, and remodeling of schools to meet these standards can contribute to the overall safety of the school, while reducing the target hardening and fortressing effects of an “old school” bunker mentality.

Security technologies such as cameras, sensors, weapons screening, etc. can contribute to overall school security, but not in all situations. School parking lots can incorporate license plate recognition systems to flag cars that are not supposed to be on campus or cars that are not registered. Schools must not undervalue the importance of good maintenance, construction, and design; and a fair and equal management style of school operations. Creating a secure and safe educational environment is all about planning, but each school has unique needs that must be determined in the CPTED Risk assessment. Best practices begin with a security threat and vulnerability assessment, which identifies the security functional requirements and design basis for each unique school environment.

About the author: Randy Atlas is America’s only architect/ criminologist. Atlas is president of Atlas Safety & Security Design, Inc., based in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. He is a registered architect in Florida, nationally accredited with the National Council Architectural Registration Board (NCARB) and is a Fellow with the American Institute of Architects. He is a Certified Protection Professional (CPP), a past chairman of the ASIS Security Architecture and Engineering Council, and an appointed member of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Premises Security Committee. Atlas is an adjunct professor at Florida Atlantic University, where he teaches a CPTED course online for the schools of Architecture and Criminal Justice. He is a member of the Florida Design Out Crime network, the International CPTED Association, a member of the International Society of Crime Prevention Practitioners, and the International Association of Counterterrorism and Security Professionals. Atlas is a nationally recognized trainer and author on Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design. Atlas authored the book 21st Century Security and CPTED in 2008, and the 2nd Edition in 2013. Atlas has conducted risk vulnerability assessment security surveys for a variety of school environments throughout the United States, including Broward County School Board – Stoneman Douglas Post shooting Security Assessment, Harvard, Ohio State, and Georgetown universities.

Atlas received his Doctor of Criminology from Florida State University, a Master’s in Architecture from the University of Illinois, and a Bachelor of Criminal Justice degree from the University of South Florida.